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LICENSING UNDER UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST LAW
Leo J. Raskind*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A holder's exploitation of an intellectual property right by
license and related arrangements has been a source of controversy among courts and commentators in the United States for
more than a century.' Doctrines of limitation, such as misuse,
originally developed around patents, have in recent years been
extended to other intellectual property regimes such as copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.2 The background and
current application of these several doctrines are the subject
matter of this paper.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF MISUSE
The primary basis for the misuse doctrine is the direct
clash of policies between two groups of federal statutes, patent
and copyright statutes on the one side and antitrust laws on
the other.' The patent and copyright laws, grounded in a constitutional foundation,4 together grant the power to exclude

* Visiting Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); E. Bement & Sons
v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1984); George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309 (1977); Douglas W.
Wyatt et al., An Overview of Developments in Antitrust Law Relating to Intellectual Property, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 373 (1986). See generally Spencer W. Waller, Understandingand Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55 (1992).
2. The misuse doctrine was applied to copyrights in Lasercomb America, Inc.
v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). A territorial licensing of a trademark
was held to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act as a horizontal agreement in United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See also Section of Antitrust Law,
A.B.A., Antitrust Issues Involving Intellectual Property, 2 ANTITRUST L. DEV. 799,
844 (3d ed. 1992); Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Recent Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Socy 339 (1991).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27, 41-51 (1988).
4. See infra note 11.
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and to restrain others from making, selling, using, reproducing, performing, or displaying the protected work. This power
permits the holder to license others to perform these granted
rights in exchange for payment of royalties. In this way, the
policy of the patent and copyright laws is implemented to provide private economic rewards for the production of creative
works beneficial to the general public. However, the terms of
the license that function in the exercise of these powers may
contain restrictive provisions that clash with the policy of the
federal (and state) antitrust laws that express a preference for
unrestricted competition as the norm of the marketplace.
In a legal regime characterized by freedom of contract and
of alienation of property, the exploitation of intellectual property rights focuses the conflict between the intellectual property
statutes and the antitrust laws on licensing practices, the principal means of exercising intellectual property rights. The
source of the conflict between the exercise of intellectual property rights and the antitrust laws is the diverging, if not inconsistent, statutory objectives of the two groups of statutes.
For example, a trademark holder may license another to
reproduce the protected work in a limited geographic region or
to a selected class of consumers, e.g., to retailers excluding
discounters or on condition that the product is sold at a stated
minimum price. Such license conditions, however, may clash
directly with the antitrust laws. Similarly, a patent holder may
license another to practice a patented process in exchange for a
reciprocal promise to purchase all associated materials from
the patentee-licensor. In each instance there is a restraint of
competition.
As the intellectual property right holder utilizes licensing
agreements to derive revenue from the statutory intellectual
property rights, the very licenses and related contractual arrangements that implement the incentive policy of these statutes may fall within clearly defined categories of practices
subjected to strict antitrust scrutiny. Thus, an intellectual
property license is a contract that may contain restrictive conditions, such as a tying arrangement subject to scrutiny under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.5

5. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992); Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Other licensing practices, such as restricting the use of a competing product with the patented good, may give rise to allegations of attempting to or actually monopolizing under Section 2
of the Sherman Act.6 Since a patent or copyright is an asset
for purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, corporate mergers
involving valuable intellectual property rights may raise
anticompetitive prospects under the merger provision.7 Similarly, trademark licensing may also have anticompetitive effects, as, for example, a licensed use of a trademark imposing
territorial limitations may be reviewed as a horizontal agreement among competitors under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
As courts were presented with cases involving this conflict
between the two statutory policies, two distinct lines of analysis emerged. In early patent cases, judges began narrowly
construing the patent claims as a means of limiting perceived
excesses in patent licensing.9 The second approach was to develop an independent concept, patent misuse, as an extension
of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" to perform the function of limiting undesired exploitation of intellectual property
rights.' ° However, the accommodation between the judicial
doctrines that seek to buffer excessive exploitation of intellectual property rights in terms of equitable doctrines and the
reliance on antitrust principles for this function, have a substantial, albeit not always predictable, area of overlap.
The reasons for the continued uncertainty in the contours
of these overlapping approaches are inherent in the nature of
the intellectual property regimes themselves. The task of devising a precise system of economic rewards for individual
creative persons is complicated initially by the macro or aggregative nature of the constitutional authority to provide for

6. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
7. Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, 701 F. Supp. 1157
(W.D. Pa. 1988).
8. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). For an empirical study
of the anticompetitive effects on the territorial restrictions in this case, see Willard
F. Mueller, The Sealy Restraints: Restrictions on Free Riding or Output?, 1989
Wis. L. REV. 1525.
9. See supra note 1.
10. See H. Thomas Austern, Umbras and Penumbras, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1015 (1965); John C. Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know-How by Grant,
Fraud,Purchase, and Grant-Back, 28 U. PiTr. L. REV. 161 (1966); John Wigmore,
The Patent Monopoly, 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY1 687 (1943).

52

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XX:I

patents and copyrights. The Constitution gives a broad, though
diffuse, mandate for federal legislation to provide an economic
incentive for creative activity for the betterment of society."
The nature of this contitutional basis of intellectual property
protection reflects the influence of Thomas Jefferson, himself
an inventor, who viewed ideas as a powerful instrument for
progress for the new nation. He feared that many useful ideas
would remain undisclosed or, if disclosed, appropriated without
compensation, unless an incentive and reward system was
provided in individual terms. 2 The rationale of this incentive
has been characterized as follows: "[T]he notion that monopoly
privileges were required to provide adequate economic incentives for inventive activity motivated the Statute of Monopo-

lies, passed by the English Parliament in 1623 ....Later, the
problem was explicitly recognized by the framers of the Constitution."5

11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. It provides, "The Congress shall have Power ...To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court
characterized the tension between determining the limitation on the exploitative
rights of an individual creative person and yet retaining the incentive for the
benefit of society as follows:
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that
should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public . ..their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interest of authors and inventors in the . . . exploitation of
their ... [works] and society's competing interest in the free flow of

ideas, information, and commerce ....
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
12. 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854).

13. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation
and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1060, 1090-91

(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
There is substantial economic literature concerned with determining the
value of a patent and the impact of new technology on market structure, competition, and welfare. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH:
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 8-31 (1984); FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 613-50 (3d ed.

1990); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962); P. Dasgupta & J.

Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J.
266 (1980); Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Dynamic R & D Competition, 97
ECON. J. 372 (1987); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, How to License Intangible
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The individual incentive system that Jefferson envisioned
rejected the natural law conception of ideas as a form of intangible property derived from labor in favor of a statutory right
which provided an economic incentive to create and to disclose.' 4 However, by utilizing a constitutional provision authorizing Congress to provide for patent and copyright legislation,
the economic incentive was expressed in aggregative, rather
than in individual terms. Accordingly, Congress enacted intellectual property rights by patent and copyright in terms of
society as a whole-all authors and inventors were eligible for
these right by meeting the statutory conditions of invention or
authorship."
At this aggregate level, statistical techniques validate the
contribution of inventive activity to society. A leading study of
gain in output per worker for the economy as a whole between
1929 and 1982 credits sixty-eight percent of the gain in productivity to improvements in scientific and technological advances.
Lesser importance is assigned to increased capital investment,
increased skills of the labor force, and realization of scale economies." Other empirical economic studies of the impact of
innovation on productivity have also been aggregative, i.e., the
study of groupings of firms and industries.'
As they function in practice, the patent and copyright
statutes grant rights and remedies on an individual basis.
Unfortunately, statistical techniques cannot serve to measure
the amount of the economic reward needed to provide the minimum requisite incentive to create and to disclose. Nor is economic analysis able to offer guidance in assessing and metering the amount of the economic incentive according to a societal valuation of the creative contribution. Yet, given the

Property, 101 Q.J. ECON. 567 (1986); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Innovation and Industry Evolution, 100 Q.J. ECON. 81 (1985).
14. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540
(1993); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections On The Law Of Copyright: I, 45
COLUmi. L. REV. 503 (1945); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
16. EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ECONoMic GROWTH, 1929-1982
30 (1985); see also SCHERER, supra note 13; Robert M. Solow, Technical Change
and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957).
17. See Cohen & Levin, supra note 13, at 1060-98.
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exclusionary and restrictive nature of intellectual property
rights granted to individuals, the need arises for mechanisms
of limitation to prevent abusive exploitation.
Thus, the problem of limiting the modes and terms of
licensing agreements exploiting intellectual property rights is
left to the legal regime without much guidance. In a legal system that recognizes private property and freedom of contract,
there is substantial latitude for exercise of those rights within
the traditional bounds of tort and contract doctrines, as well as
the substantial statutory framework of the antitrust laws.
After a period of judicial experimentation, two themes of review and of limitation of intellectual property licenses
emerged. Some courts invoked traditional equitable principles
to shape the misuse doctrine. 8 Other courts applied the criteria of the antitrust laws as a guide to restricting certain modes
of exploitation by right holders. 9
There is another contributing factor to the present state of
the law governing intellectual property licenses, the shifting
focus of the antitrust laws. The antitrust laws applicable to
intellectual property licensing practices underwent change in
the 1980s to reflect a new conception of the underlying economic models relevant to vertical restraints analysis generally.20 Originating in the 1920s, the Supreme Court and the enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, viewed intellectual property licenses as appropriate subjects of antitrust scrutiny.2 ' The underly-

18. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AD ANTITRUST LAW § 1.07
(1994); Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257 (1991).
19. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 828 F.2d 755 (Fed. Cir. 1987); USM
Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1107 (1983).
20. See infra note 50.
21. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992) (remanded for further discovery to determine the possibility of market power in spare parts); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969) (patent misuse to require licensee to compute royalty payment based on
total sales, including products made without reliance on patent); Northern Pacific
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (lease clause providing for preferential
routing by lessee on lessor's railroad violates § 1 of Sherman Act); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 292 (1947) (requiring purchasers of a patented
salt-using machine to purchase ordinary salt from patentee violates § 1 of
Sherman Act); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (requiring purchasers of patented machines to buy patentee's punch cards violates § 3 of Clayton

1993]

LICENSING UNDER U.S. LAW

ing premise of that perspective was that patents and copyrights were statutory monopolies that, as such, contained the
potential for restrictive, anticompetitive abuses.22
This perception of patents as conferring clear monopoly
power became the basis for the judicial development of countervailing doctrines of limitation. For example, patentees
sought to widen the ambit of their patent claims through licensing provisions that restricted the purchase of unpatented
goods associated with the protected method or process. As
patentees brought actions for contributory infringement to
protect this extension of their patent claims,' alleged infringers resisted by urging a narrow definition of contributory infringement and by raising equitable defenses of wrongful conduct by the patentee.2 4
As courts sought to deny relief to patentees seeking to
restrain the purchase of unpatented items in conjunction with
licensed method, process, and combination patents, the doctrine of patent misuse evolved.' As the case law of misuse
developed, it drew upon both traditional equitable doctrines
and antitrust principles for criteria of limitation of the
patentee's right to exploit the patent beyond the stated claims.
In Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,26 the Supreme Court rejected a patentee's claim of contributory infringement and
invalidated a license provision requiring the use of the
patentee's unpatented salt tablets with its patented salt dispenser by reference to Clayton Act standards as follows:

Act); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
(patent misuse successfully invoked by defendant against charge of contributory
infringement by selling dry ice to a licensee required to buy plaintiffs dry ice and
its cooler cabinet); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922)
(lease barring use of complementary machines with right to use patented machine
of lessor violates § 3 of the Clayton Act).
In 1972, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department issued a checklist
of nine licensing practices that would invite antitrust scrutiny. See infra note 41.
22. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (requisite economic power
is presumed where the tying product is patented or copyrighted).
23. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
24. Carbice Corp. of America v. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1971).
25. The Court in Carbice described misuse of the patent without applying the
phrase as follows: "Relief is denied because the . . . [patentee] is attempting, without sanction of law, to employ the patent to secure a limited monopoly of unpatented material in applying the invention." Id. at 33-34.
26. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
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[Tihe present suit is for infringement of a patent. The question we must decide is not necessarily whether respondent
has violated the Clayton Act... [section 31, but whether a
court of equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent is using it as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article.2"
The doctrine of patent misuse did not develop smoothly. As
the Supreme Court sought subsequently to refine the concept
of patent misuse, it unsettled the doctrine of contributory infringement. In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,2 8 the
Court invalidated a licensing provision that coupled the
patentee's agreement to permit the licensee to practice the
combination patent on condition that an unpatented component be purchased from a designated supplier.29 Justice
Douglas's opinion materially narrowed the scope of the contributory infringement doctrine by stating, "[Tihe result of this
decision... is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may be left, we need not stop
to consider."" Some lower court judges then considered contributory infringement a tainted doctrine;3 ' others read
Mercoid as a clear misuse case that left untouched the doctrine
of contributory infringement.3 2
Sufficient uncertainty developed as to the scope of contributory infringement as to invite congressional review and reaffirmation of this doctrine in the 1952 revision of the Patent
Act. 3 In amending section 271 of Title 35, Congress expressly
asserted the existence of the doctrine of contributory infringement and undertook to accommodate it to the misuse doctrine. 4 The legislative history announces this objective as
27. Id. at 490.
28. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
29. Id. at 669.
30. Id.
31. Judge Learned Hand interpreted Mercoid as placing the doctrine of contributory infringement as one "not wholly free from doubt." Stokes & Smith Co. v.
Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1946); see also DONALD
S. CHISUM, 5 PATENTS § 19.04 (1993).
32. Florence-Mayo Numway Co. v. Hardy, 168 F.2d 778 (4th Cir. 1948) (patent misuse distinguished from contributory infringement).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) as amended, H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1952).
34. Section 271 provides:
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follows: "The purpose of this section is to codify in statutory
form principles of contributory infringement and at the same
time to eliminate ... doubt and confusion."35 The legislative
history establishes that section 271(c), as amended, reinstates
the doctrine of contributory infringement. Further, new section
271(d) was intended to overrule cases holding that the assertion of patent infringement against a contributing infringer
would, without more, constitute patent misuse." In Dawson
Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Co., the Supreme Court, reviewing the new section 271 and its legislative history, held that
section 271(d) gave a patentee "limited power to exclude others
from competition in nonstaple goods."" Accordingly, the Court
did not find patent misuse in the refusal of the patentee to
deal further with licensees who insisted on purchasing unpatented chemicals for use in connection with the licensed patented process.
While the Supreme Court in Dawson Chemical recognized
a congressional narrowing of the scope of patent misuse, some
lower courts considered the role of the misuse doctrine to have
been fully absorbed by the antitrust laws. The most articulate
expression of such reliance on antitrust criteria is in a Seventh
Circuit case upholding a differential royalty provision among
various sub-licensees as follows:
One still finds ...statements in judicial opinions that less
evidence of anticompetitive effect is required in a misuse case

(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having done one or more of the following: ....

Id. Subsections b, c, and d of Section 271 have remained unchanged to date. See
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 2402 (1952).
36. Id.
37. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
38. Id.

58
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than in an antitrust case.
If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust
principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is
not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse .... 9
However, the quest for clarification of the misuse doctrine
via antitrust principles has turned out to be illusory, ° for the
antitrust analysis has itself been in flux. Beginning in the
early 1970s, the case law involving patent licensing practices
had developed to the point that the Antitrust Division undertook to provide a list of suspect patent license provisions. The
list of nine licensing practices, publicized as the "Nine No-Nos"
of patent licensing, was offered as a summary checklist of the
Justice Department's enforcement policy.4 These listed intellectual property licensing provisions were considered possible
antitrust violations that might warrant further investigation.
From the perspective of the Antitrust Division, these listed

39. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); USM
Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
40. Kaplow, supra note 1.
41. See A.B. Lipsky, Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing
Practices, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515 (1985). The listed practices were:
1)
Tying arrangements - unlawful for the licensor to require a licensee to purchase unpatented materials from the licensor;
2)
Assignment or exclusive grant-back of improvements - unlawful for
a patentee to require a licensee to assign to the patentee any
patent which may be issued to the licensee after entering into the
licensing agreement;
3)
Restraints on resale of licensed product - unlawful to attach conditions on the resale of the patented product by the purchaser;
4)
Limiting licensee freedom to deal in goods and services not covered by the licensed patent - patentee cannot restrict licensee
freedom to deal in goods and services outside the scope of the
patent;
5)
Exclusive licensing - unlawful for a patentee to agree with licensee
that patentee will not grant further licenses to others without
consent of first licensee;
6)
Compulsory package licensing - licensing only a group of patents is
an unlawful extension of the patent grant;
Compulsory use of total sales, rather than sales of licensed item,
7)
as a royalty base;
8)
Restrictions on sale of unpatented goods made by a licensed patented process;
9)
Price-fixing - unlawful to dictate the resale price of the products
made by a patented process under license.
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practices would invite antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and, if supported by credible evidence of a restraint of trade under the then existing case law, more probably than not, would be held to be illegal per se.2
The shift in the antitrust law of vertical restraints accomplished by the Court's decision in Continental T.V.Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.4" changed the perception of the Nine No-No's
and of vertical restraints. From its original conception as a list
of suspect practices that were likely to invite antitrust scrutiny, the No-No's were rejected, if not vilified, as exemplars of
misguided antitrust policies. As the new perspective was stated,
[Miany of the practices condemned under the harsh, rigid
misuse doctrine are forms of tying. Relying on simplistic,
non-economically related notions of market power, courts
have ... unmercifully condemned tying requirements as a
per se illegal attempt to extend the patent monopoly to a
product outside of the patent. Of course, this simply ignores
what we now understand to be the potential procompetitive
benefits of tying arrangements."
In this spirit, Congress contributed to further limitation of
the misuse doctrine in the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988
which added section 271(d)(5) to Title 35.45 This amendment
expressly withdraws the presumption of market power for
antitrust purposes from a patent. As a result of this amendment, a patent license may lawfully include the condition that
the licensee of an apparatus, for example, purchases an unpatented item from the patentee. To prevail against the requirement, the licensee must meet the evidentiary burden imposed
by new section 271(d)(5) of showing that "the patent owner has

42. Antitrust Guide for International Operations, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 77, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977).
43. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The doctrinal shift is expressed by the title of Judge
Posner's article, Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
44. Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Technology Licensing and the Second American Revolution: Storming the Ramparts
of Antitrust and Misuse, Address Before the John Marshall Law School (Feb. 22,
1985), in 4 ROGER MILGRMI, TRADE SECRETS, app. H3, H-3-1 (1991).
45. Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988).
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market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product."4 6
The direct effect of this legislation is twofold. First, it
overrules the line of patent/antitrust tying cases based on
Morton Salt." Patent tie-in arrangements are no longer illegal per se. Second, it negates the dictum in Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde4' that a patent may be presumed to confer
market power in tie-in cases. 9

III. CURRENT ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Analysis of the current antitrust consequences of licenses
by United States patentees involving foreign parties is controlled by a clutch of other statutes and regulations in addition
to the antitrust laws themselves. First, there are the 1988
Guidelines For International Operations.' Then there is the
National Cooperative Research Act which, on timely notice to
the Justice Department, permits rule of reason scrutiny of
horizontal research and development joint venture agreements." In addition, the Export Trading Company Act permits the Department of Commerce to issue certificates granting limited antitrust immunity for specified licensing activities." Then, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
limits the application of the Sherman Act to some foreign

46. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988).
47. Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
48. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
49. Dictum in the majority opinion of Jefferson Parish expressed the characterization of a patent as granting monopoly power as follows: "Any effort to enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power it confers to
restrain competition in the market for a second product will undermine competition on the merits in that second market." Id. at 16.
However, four Justices rejected this view as a "common misconception" stating that "a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there are
close substitutes for the patented product." Id. at 37 n.7.
50. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
For International Operations § 3.6, in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 13,109 § 3.6
(1988). The International Guidelines would also draw on the domestic Vertical
Restraint Guidelines, but these were withdrawn on August 10, 1993. See Anne K.
Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Address Before the
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1993), in 7 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 9 50,110 (1993).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4053 (1988).
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commerce. 3 In addition, arbitration proceedings for some international licensing disputes are provided by the Federal
Arbitration Act.54 These provisions, taken together have a relatively minor impact on the framework of antitrust legislation.
Nevertheless, they must be consulted in specific cases.
More basic to determining the current state of the law of
licensing is the approach of the Clinton administration to antitrust enforcement. There are some signs that there will be a
return to a more active posture of enforcement. One indicator
of change is the withdrawal by the Antitrust Division of the
Vertical Restraint Guidelines on August 10, 1993. 5 This action follows the recommendation of Report of the Special Task
Force on Competition Policy, of the ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, which in addition to withdrawal of the old Guidelines
recommended that "[f]uture vertical restraints cases should
focus on conduct that appears to have consequences that could
impair the competitive functioning of a relevant market."5
How enforcement policy will change remains to be seen,
but it is clear that contemporary economic analysis of vertical
restraints supports the case for a return to antitrust scrutiny
of licensing practices. The contrast between the dominant economic approaches of the early 1980s and the mid-1990s analysis is marked. In 1985 a spokesman for the Reagan Antitrust
Division stated, seemingly with some urgency, the need to
reject the Nine No-No's when he said, "[t]he Second American
Revolution is under way ....The job is not over, however. We
must ensure that the revolution continues and grows. No other
reform in the area of competition law is as important ....We
must now storm the ramparts of unnecessary, unwise antitrust
and misuse policy .....

53. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards would also be applicable. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
55. 4 Trade Reg. Rep., supra note 50, %13,105.
56. Caswell D. Hobbs III et al., Report of the Special Task Force on Competition Policy, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 977, 990-91 (1993).
57. See Rule, supra note 44.
In a recent address, Richard H. Stern noted that this rhetoric overstated
the role of the "Nine No-No's" as they were conceived and implemented by the
prior administration. Stern, citing the above quotation, comments on it as follows:
That interpretation rests on the premise that the No-No's were a kind of
Restatement of the Law of Patent Licensing, authored by the pre-Reagan
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In 1985, the pervasive antitrust view of vertical restraints, as
articulated by Judge Bork, deemed them as presumptively
efficiency enhancing and, accordingly, not appropriate subjects
of antitrust scrutiny.5 8
By the end of the Bush administration, there was apparently some change in perspective toward antitrust enforcement
generally. In 1991, the head of the Antitrust Division expressed the view that some enforcement activity might be
warranted against foreign cartels that had entered into agreements not to buy spare parts from United States manufacturers.5 9 As of the end of 1992, the Clinton administration had
not announced its antitrust policy.6 °
Despite the absence of an announced antitrust enforcement policy, it is clear that the foundation of legal and economic analysis, sometimes referred to as the Chicago School, that
was the bedrock of enforcement policy in the Reagan-Bush
presidencies, is no longer dominant.
As the underlying premises of the static economic model of
a perfectly competitive market, upon which the pro-competitive
characterization of vertical restraints was based, has come
under analytical and empirical scrutiny of the current generation of industrial organization economists, refinements and adjustments are being made in the prior model.61 Recent writers
Antitrust Division. In this supposed Restatement, nine patent licensing
practices were proscribed under the antitrust laws-indeed, declared per
se illegal antitrust violations as a matter of substantive law. Nothing
could be more removed from reality.
That is shown by what the Antitrust Division actually did during
the 1970's .

. .

. Rather than relying on No-No status as a supposed

badge of per se antitrust illegality, the Division brought a patent-antitrust suit only when it thought it could establish a substantial, actual
lessening of competition in a relevant market. It then attempted to prove
anticompetitive effects in the trial court (citing United States v. CibaGeigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118 (D. N.J. 1976)).
Richard H. Stern, What Ever Happened to the Nine No-No's, Address before the
American Bar Association, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 3-4
(Aug. 10, 1993). The point of the illustration is that in court the pre-Reagan Antitrust Division did not consider No-No status for a licensing practice to be outcomedeterminative.
58. Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT.
REV. 171.
59. Paul M. Barrett, Agency Wants Bush to Extend Antitrust Law, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 30, 1991, at A3.
60. See Hobbs, supra note 56, for a review of the question of the role of antitrust in the contemporary economic national and international setting.
61. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
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have modified the earlier assumptions of the decisional processes of firm managers by taking transaction costs into account.62 While the Chicago School should be credited both
with contributing a critical perspective of the conventional
economic wisdom of the 1950s and with bringing some necessary modification in analysis and policy, more recent economic
scholarship is now modifying many of the Chicago School premises. Its sweeping conclusion that enhanced consumer welfare and allocative efficiency are always to be derived from
vertical restraints are, in turn, being examined and refined by
the scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s.63
While the dominant voices of the Chicago School were
legal scholars, the analysis and refinement of their work has
been accomplished by the economists specializing in the field of
industrial organization. Beginning in the mid-1980s these
economists began to refine the economic models underlying the
antitrust analysis of vertical restraints. Thus, Comanor wrote,
When vertical restraints are used to promote the provision of
distribution services, the critical issue for antitrust purposes
remains whether consumers are better served by lower prices
and fewer services or by higher prices and more services ....
Because vertical restraints can either enhance or diminish
consumer welfare... it is tempting to apply the rule of reason analysis on a case-by-case basis .... Yet it is no easy
task to determine whether particular restraints increase or
decrease efficiency: the answer in each case depends largely
on the relative preferences of different groups of consumers. 64

ch. 20 (2d ed. 1994); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 13.
62. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 423-59
(1991); see also OLIVER E. WILLMISON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 1-14 (1975).

63. For an example of the Chicago School's analysis of vertical restraints, see
Posner, supra note 43.
64. William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions,
and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 1001 (1985); see also Richard
E. Caves, Vertical Restraints in Manufacturer-DistributorRelations, in ANTITRUST
AND REGULATION 29 (R. Grieson ed., 1986). Caves characterizes the manufacturerdealer relationship as:
[A] subtle context in which the effects of alternative bargains between
the manufacturer and retailer are determined ....
[There are] consequences for both intrabrand and interbrand competition ...
that vary

from product to product, depending on the cost structures of the retailers,
the dimensions of nonprice rivalry available to them, and all structural
conditions of the manufacturer's market ....
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Similarly, Scherer and Ross, leading industrial organization
economists, urge the need for a dynamic model in understanding the "free rider" justification for all vertical restraints. They
state,
most of the presale service implied in... [the free rider assumption] is unnecessary when the customer already knows
what she wants and why .... [M]ost of the goods sold in
supermarkets, clothing stores, furniture outlets, and much
else are ruled out .... [Tihe free-riding argument applies
mainly for purchases of reasonably high value."
Other economists, reviewing the model of the 1980s that posited perfect competition at the producer level, conclude that
vertical restraints analysis should assess, rather than assume,
the character of competitive relationships at the producer level.6" Other investigators have put this point affirmatively,
stating that
producers' competition is in fact a crucial element for the
analysis of vertical arrangements .... [When] several producers are imperfectly competing at the upper level, then
vertical restraints may serve to facilitate collusion ....
[C]ontractual arrangements may be efficient, in ... that joint

profits are higher, but the gains to the producers and the
distributors are at the expense of consumers. Vertical restraints may thus not be socially desirable. 7
Id. at 46.
65. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 13, at 551-52.
66. Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 921 (1986); see also Benjamin Klein & Benjamin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988). They
criticize the Chicago School's view of vertical restraints as follows: "The standard
economic analysis of vertical restraints is fundamentally flawed. Vertical restraints,
by themselves, do not create a direct incentive for retailers to supply desired services." Id. at 266. Another critic notes: "It is a long-standing but deeply flawed
assumption that in the absence of a cartel the markets downstream from the
manufacturer are close enough to being . . . perfectly competitive . . . ." Robert L.
Steiner, Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 155,
200 (1991). Steiner also criticizes the premise that restricting intrabrand competition has a salutary consequence as follows: "[T]here is no basis for a sweeping
generalization that the net welfare effect of stifling intrabrand competition and
stimulating interbrand competition will be favorable." Robert L. Steiner, Sylvania
Economics-A Critique, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 44-45 (1991).
67. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, Vertical Restraints and Producers' Competition, 32 EUR. ECON. REV. 561, 562 (1988).
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Unlike the Chicago School writers, current economic scholarship applies empirical techniques to the basic premises about
price and output decision by firm managers." One such study
concluded from an examination of the record in a litigated case
that the stated reliance on the "free rider" problem was better
characterized as an abuse of market power.69 The trend toward empirical verification of antitrust issues will almost certainly continue, and as is the nature of intellectual activity,
the broad generalizations of the earlier doctrines will yield and
be reshaped by this critical commentary.
The antitrust scholarship of the 1990s abhors the absence
of data. As one investigator of vertical restraint analysis
writes: "The current dearth of empirical evidence on the use of
vertical restraints and of RPM in particular seriously limits
the development of economic understanding of these practices ....
This empirical vacuum is especially pressing in the
policy setting, where the relative importance of the efficiency
and inefficiency theories is fundamental." °
A leading antitrust authority sees the enforcement consequences of these changes as follows:
Today... antitrust policy is coming increasingly under the
influence of 'post-Chicago' economics that is both more complex and more ambiguous than the Chicago School model.
This new complexity makes it much more difficult for
enforcement agencies and particularly for courts to make
judgments about whether a particular practice... is competitive or anticompetitive. 1
A recent speech by the incumbent head of the Antitrust
Division suggests that these changes in economic analysis will
be a factor in enforcement policy. Thus, she said,

68. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
69. Willard F. Mueller & Fredrick E. Geithman, An Empirical Test of the Free
Rider and Market Power Hypotheses, 73 REv. ECON. & STAT. 301 (1991) (reviewing
the record of United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967)).
70. Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence From
Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263, 293 (1991). For an empirical study of pricing
practices of differentiated products, see Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between Price
and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL. ECON. 921 (1988).
71. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213,
225 (1985).
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[ilt has long been common, if not necessarily accurate, to
speak of the tension between patent [and copyright] law and
the antitrust laws .... The courts, with the general acquiescence of Congress, attempt to accommodate both policies, and
the Antitrust Division recognizes the need to balance these
concerns .... Recognizing the importance to innovation of an
appropriate antitrust/intellectual property accommodation,
and the inadequacy of intuitive and ad hoc responses, I have
asked... my Economics Deputy to chair a task force.., to
review and reformulate the Division's policies on intellectual
property and antitrust.72
It is interesting to speculate as to the impact of these
suggested changes on traditional categories of antitrust scrutiny of intellectual property licensing.
IV. THE MISUSE DOCTRiNE
It is most likely that the misuse doctrine will continue to
serve as an independent equitable doctrine, rather than be
absorbed by antitrust principles.7 3 Indeed, a recent patent
case underscores the danger of supplanting the misuse doctrine by antitrust analysis. In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc.,7 Mallinckrodt, the patentee, sold its device that served
as a container of radioactive material for application in diagnostic chest x-ray procedures to hospitals with a single use
restriction. Defendant, Medipart, offered hospitals a recycling
service for these devices at less than half the cost of a new one.
For its fee, Medipart would refit the device, sterilize it and
return it for re-use. When Mallinckrodt sued the recycler for
patent infringement, the district court dismissed the suit on
grounds of misuse and "first sale" doctrine. On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Applying the antitrust
analysis of vertical restraints, the Federal Circuit remanded
the case for a review under rule of reason analysis according to
antitrust principles.
Ignoring the misuse doctrine misconceives its origins as
well as its function. The misuse doctrine addresses conduct

72. Speech by Assistant Attorney General Anne
in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

. Bingaman, Jan. 10, 1994,

50,128, page 48,998.

73. See supra text accompanying note 39.
74. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed Cir. 1992), rev'g 15 U.S.P.Q. 1113 (N.D. Il 1990).
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that is not within the purview of antitrust analysis, as for
example, collecting royalties after the expiration of a patent or
compulsory package licensing. Misuse arose as and remains an
expression of public policy in administering the patent system;
although it may overlap antitrust concerns, it should not be
absorbed by principles of competition. The Federal Circuit's
decision ignores long-standing Supreme Court precedent that
the first sale ends the patentee's control over use. 5
The vitality of the misuse doctrine is illustrated in its
recent extension to the copyright regime. In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds," the Fourth Circuit extended the rationale of patent misuse to a copyright case, noting that copyright
protection and patent law serve the public interest in a parallel manner. Lasercomb had created and copyrighted a software
program for die-making, including in the diskette containing
the copyrighted program a system of copy protection. The defendant, a licensee, overcame that internal security system,
made multiple copies of a modification of the protected program, and began to sell that program in competition with its
licensor. The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court's holding
of infringement. The appellate court found misuse in the license terms that extended the prohibition against developing
competing products beyond the duration of copyright protection, as well as the extension of the scope of the restriction on
creative activity to include all officers, directors, and employees
of the licensee. Rejecting antitrust analysis, the court stated:
"The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of antitrust law. . . , but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy
embodied in the grant of a copyright. 7
V. PRICE-FIXING
The new economic analysis will make no change in this
basic fixture of antitrust law. A license by a holder of intellectual property rights that required, for example, a manufacturer-licensee to adhere to the licensor's stated resale price,

75. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed, 157 U.S. 659 (1895); Hobbie v. Jennison,
149 U.S. 355 (1893); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
76. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 978.

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XX:1

remains subject to antitrust scrutiny and to the rule that pricefixing is illegal per se.7" Earlier Supreme Court cases that
have struck down patent licenses containing provisions that
fixed the resale price of the licensee, will not be disturbed by
the current economic analysis."
VI. TIE-INS
The antitrust law treatment of this practice reflects the
widest swing of the doctrinal pendulum. Since the IBM card
sorting decision in 1936,80 the legal treatment of patent tie-ins
has moved from the strictly illegal per se category, based on a
presumption of market power attributable to the existence of
the patent, to a modified rule of reason approach. Gone is the
presumption that the existence of the patent establishes market power in an antitrust tie-in case."'
The antitrust treatment of tie-ins involving patents, will
be also affected procedurally by a recent Supreme Court decision alleging a tie-in of service to parts. In Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services,82 the majority remanded the case
for further discovery to determine the existence of market
power in the derivative aftermarket of the tying product (services), after it was conceded that no such power existed in the
primary product (photocopier) market.8 3 Such an analysis is
already required to be made of the tying product market of
patented items, as a result of the legislative changes in the

78. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
377 U.S. 13 (1964); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
393 (1911). But see Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988);
see also STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 224-314 (1993).
79. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline v.
United States, 309 U.S. 466 (1940).
80. International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
81. See supra notes 48-49.
82. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
83. Id. Parenthetically, it may be noted that the majority's decision may be a
precursor of a shift by the Court away from the vertical restraint analysis of the
Chicago School. The opinion effectively rejects the trial court's acceptance of the
defendant's theory that absent a showing of market power for the tying product
(which was conceded), it was to be conclusively presumed that there could not be
market power and a negative impact on interstate commerce in the tied product.
Similarly, the Court reinstated a § 2 claim of monopolizing the sale of service for
its machines. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power In Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1447 (1993).
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Patent Act made in 1988.' Accordingly, a patentee may lawfully apply a tie-in condition if the tying patent did not have a
substantial market share in the market in which the patent
operates. And further, the effect of the tie-in is not foreclosure
of a substantial amount of interstate commerce.85 Moreover,
despite a showing of market power, the traditional defense of
protecting product quality may be asserted. 6 The likely effect
of the Kodak decision is to increase the burden on defendants
in summary judgment proceedings in patent tie-in cases. To
the extent that the Kodak decision rejected an economic model
as proof of the absence of market power, defendants will be
required to come forward with credible evidence in order to
forestall findings of triable issues. '
Courts have traditionally followed the treatment of patent
tie-ins in dealing with copyright restrictions.8 However, the
doctrine of copyright misuse, although noted in some opinions,
has not achieved independent status in antitrust cases. 9 As
to restrictive copyright license terms, such as tie-ins and other
conditions, except price-fixing, the Supreme Court has traditionally followed rule of reason analysis. Some circuit courts
have recognized the doctrine of copyright misuse as a defense
to claims of illegal tying and licensing arrangements, although
balancing misuse with other factors. Copyright misuse, however, has been more frequently invoked exclusively in the copyright context as a defense to an action for infringement.9 '

84. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.

85. Assuming also the existence of a tie between two distinct products. See
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1702 (1991).
86. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
affd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
87. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARv. L. REV.
22, 334 (1992); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST J. 277 (1994).
88. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (barring pricefixing by copyright holders by analogy to patentee).
89. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(reversing Court of Appeals holding that blanket licenses constituted both antitrust
violations and patent misuse, without discussing patent misuse).
90. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, No. 81-1333, 1982
WL 19198 (7th Cir. March 25, 1982); United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co.,
855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
91. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992). For a discussion of the recent software cases, see, Charles R. McManis,
Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in
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Trademarks have been recognized as a distinct tying product and the prior presumption of market power that existed for
patents had been extended to trademarks.92 Although the
1988 amendment to Section 271 of the Patent Act is not applicable to trademarks, it is likely that the argument will be
made that there be judicial extension of it to trademarks, an
argument that is likely to be found persuasive. The current
economic approach to vertical restraints seems better suited to
identify material anticompetitive practices in terms of products
in relevant markets, rather than by trademarks and tying
analysis. Moreover, some courts had earlier avoided the tie-in
issue in trademark cases by finding the trademark to be inseparable from its underlying product.9 3 These two factors suggest that it is most unlikely that a presumption of market
power would be inferred from the existence of a trademark in
tie-in cases.
VII. PATENT ROYALTY COMPUTATION
Although the Supreme Court has referred to patent misuse
in a license that required computation of royalties in terms of
products other than the patented products itself, that opinion
did permit the convenience of the parties to countervail the
conclusion of illegality. Moreover, the Court held that a total
sales formula in itself, was not illegal.9 4 Similar flexibility
regarding output limitations in a patent license is reflected in
a recent case.95
The practice of discriminatory royalties, in which the patentee charged different royalties to different licensees, is generally not held to be patent misuse or an antitrust violation.96
There is, however, a case decided under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act that held illegal a licensor's structure

the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 26, 44-48

(1993).
92. Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972).
93. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Principe v.
McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
94. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
95. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
96. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
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of discriminatory rates, where the patentee also had a monopoly in the patented machine.9 7 Accordingly, charging different
royalties to several licensees should not be illegal where the
differences reflect material economic differences in the
licensor's costs of dealing with various licensees.

VIII. TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
Patent licenses that restrict the practice of the patent in a
part of the United States are not unlawful. 9' Moreover, the
patentee may license manufacture on condition of sale to stated customers. 9 Territorial restrictions that were held illegal
were found to be part of a larger scheme of horizontal territorial limitation, a practice illegal per se under Section 1 of the
01
Sherman Act. o Similarly, in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
the Court held as illegal horizontal territorial division, a licensing arrangement of a trademark imposed by the licensor
and agreed to by the licensees.
Kindred restrictions-field-of-use restrictions-permit a
patentee to license the practice of the patent and to particularize the use by the licensee. In the leading case, a patent holder
on sound amplifiers licensed one manufacturer for the theater
market and another for the home radio receiver market, a
practice found lawful by the Supreme Court. 02 Lower courts
have generally upheld such restrictions, and where these restrictions have been subjected to antitrust scrutiny, rule of
reason analysis has been applied.' O3

97. LaPayre v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (affirming
in part and setting aside in part the order of the Federal Trade Commission);
Grand Caillou Packing Co., 65 F.T.C. 799 (1964).
98. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Miller
Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Tenn.
1985).
99. In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 541 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1976)
cert. denied sub nom, Lex Tex Ltd., Inc. v. Univ. Textured Yarns, Inc., 433 U.S.
910 (1977); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
100. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), affd, 332 U.S. 319
(1947).
101. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
102. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, affd
on rehg, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
103. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 176 F.2d 799
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IX. PACKAGE LICENSING

The practice by an intellectual right holder of licensing
several or all of the patents or copyrights may pose an antitrust problem. The practice has the potential of permitting the
holder of one valuable right to condition the license for that
patent or copyright on the taking of inferior or undesired
rights, a practice held to be a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act in Loew's, the "block booking" case. 10 4 As to patents, the 1988 amendment to Section 271(d)(5) of the Patent
Act, forecloses such a holding as to a patent, absent proof that
the licensor actually has market power in the relevant market
for the product of the "tying" patent.05
One further variable needs to be taken into account in
undertaking to assess the likely nature of antitrust enforcement activity relating to intellectual property licensing. That
variable is the function of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit as a forum with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in
patent cases.' This new appellate forum, designed to facilitate uniformity in the application of patent principles, is required to look to the law of the various circuits in cases involving the antitrust aspects of patent cases. Thus, uniformity in
this subset of patent law will be slow to evolve, notwithstanding changes in the economic analysis of vertical restraints. As
one commentator has put the dilemma,
Cases on the antitrust/patent interface provide a good example of how difficult it will now be to incorporate doctrinal
changes into the law. Competition policy has undergone substantial re-examination which should have important ramifications for both antitrust and patent law ....[Yet] the
CAFC must view the changes in antitrust law filtered
through the lens of the regional circuits."°

(1st Cir. 1949), affd, 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford Empire
Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949).
104. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(blanket license of multiple copyright remanded for rule of reason analysis); United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
105. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
107. Id. at 43.
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X. CONCLUSION

While antitrust enforcement policy of intellectual property
licensing is a small part of the competition policy for the entire
economy, it is likely to be the more visible segment. As the
health care issue moves through the legislative process, it is
foreseeable that the cost of pharmaceutical compounds, most of
which are patented and distributed under licenses, will be a
topic of discussion. If the cost of drugs becomes a hotly debated
topic, antitrust of pricing and licensing practices are likely to
result.

